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Abstract: 
We study optimal nominal demand policy in an economy with monopolistic competition and 
flexible prices when firms have imperfect common knowledge about the shocks hitting the 
economy. Parametrizing firms’ information imperfections by a (Shannon) capacity parameter 
that constrains the amount of information flowing to each firm, we study how policy that 
minimizes a quadratic objective in output and prices depends on this parameter. When price 
setting decisions of firms are strategic complements, for a large range of capacity values 
optimal policy nominally accommodates mark-up shocks in the short-run. This finding is 
robust to the policy maker observing shocks imperfectly or being uncertain about firms’ 
capacity parameter. With persistent mark-up shocks accommodation may increase in the 
medium term, but decreases in the long-run thereby generating a hump-shaped price response 
and a slow reduction in output. Instead, when prices are strategic substitutes, policy tends to 
react restrictively to mark-up shocks. However, rational expectations equilibria may then not 
exist with small amounts of imperfect common knowledge. 
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knowledge, higher order beliefs, Shannon capacity ”The peculiar character of the problem of rational economic order is de-
termined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of
which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form
but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory
knowledge which all the separate individuals possess.”
Friedrich A. Hayek (1945)
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Decentralized economic activity, as it takes place in modern market economies,
tends to generate decentralized knowledge, i.e. knowledge which is not neces-
sarily shared among all agents that might ﬁnd it potentially relevant.
Most economic models, however, derive policy recommendations under the
assumption that private agents share a common information set. In the realm of
monetary policy, for example, information asymmetries between private agents
have not yet received much attention, and the literature has mainly focused on
asymmetries between the private sector and the policy maker (e.g. Svensson
and Woodford (2002a, 2002b)).
This paper considers optimal monetary policy when private agents do not
share a common information set and thereby seeks to close in part this gap in
the monetary policy literature.
Presented is a simple model with imperfectly competitive ﬁrms, ﬂexible
prices, and a policy maker using nominal demand to minimize the quadratic
deviations of output and prices from target. The novel feature of the model
is that ﬁrms (an potentially also the policy maker) possess private informa-
tion about the shocks hitting the economy and that for such a setting optimal
nominal demand policy is determined.
As pointed out earlier by Keynes (1936) and Phelps (1983), disparate infor-
mation sets coupled with the assumption that agents hold rational expectations
generate substantial diﬃculties: optimal decision making then requires that
agents formulate so-called higher order beliefs, i.e. beliefs about the beliefs of
others and beliefs about what the others believe about others, and so on ad
inﬁnitum.1 This is the case because agents’ optimal decisions typically depend
on the choices of other agents and, thus, on other agents’ beliefs.2
Despite these diﬃculties, a number of recent papers successfully pioneered
methods to determine rational expectations equilibria in imperfect common
1Morris and Shin (2000) have shown that agents do not necessarily have to formulate such
higher order beliefs. In binary action games, optimal decisions can be generated by holding
simple uniform beliefs about other agents’ actions.
2In the present model such dependencies arise from price competition between ﬁrms.
2knowledge environments, most notably Townsend (1983b, 1983a), Sargent (1991),
Binder and Pesaran (1998), and Woodford (2002), and the recent literature on
global games, see Morris and Shin (2000).
While the present paper in many respects is simpler than these earlier contri-
butions it adds to them by solving an optimal policy problem for a private sector
rational expectations equilibrium with imperfect common knowledge. With the
exception of Morris and Shin (2003) and Amato and Shin (2003) who derive nor-
mative implications regarding the disclosure of public information in imperfect
common knowledge settings, this has not been done before.
In a related paper Ball et al. (2002) analyze optimal monetary policy with
disparate information by assuming that some agents set prices based on lagged
information. Although similar in spirit, their paper diﬀers considerably since
information lags do not generate imperfect common knowledge.
The paper generates imperfect common knowledge structures by assuming
that each ﬁrm receives information through an information channel that is con-
t a m i n a t e dw i t hi d i o s y n c r a t i cn o i s e . I n formation channels are a concept bor-
rowed from information theory, see Shannon (1948), and are characterized by a
simple technology parameter called channel capacity.3
The channel capacity conveniently parametrizes the information frictions
in the economy: When channel capacity is equal to zero, ﬁrms receive no in-
formation about shocks or policy decisions; as capacity increases the amount of
information received by agents also increases, and becomes perfect (in the limit)
as capacity becomes inﬁnite.4
There are several advantages in modelling information frictions with the help
of information channels.
Firstly, the information structure turns out endogenous to the model since
ﬁrms optimally choose which variables to observe through their channels. The
observed variables will thereby depend on the monetary policy pursued by the
policy maker.5
Secondly, in the presence of imperfect common knowledge information chan-
nels preserve the linear quadratic nature of the policy problem and thereby allow
for simple closed form solutions.
The main policy conclusion derived is the following: When ﬁrms’ prices are
strategic complements, for a large range of intermediate capacity values optimal
policy nominally accommodates mark-up shocks in the short-run .
3See Sims (2001) for a recent application of information channels to macroeconomics.
4Information should here be understood in the sense of information theory, i.e. as the
diﬀerence in entropy between prior and posterior beliefs.
5In the language of Kalman ﬁltering: agents can choose their observation equation knowing
that the variance of the observation noise will be determined by the channel capacity to limit
the information content of the signal.
3This is the case because strategic complementarities strengthen the impor-
tance of higher-order beliefs in ﬁrms’ price setting decisions, as explained in the
text. Since higher-order beliefs react less strongly to the information received
by agents than beliefs of lower order, complementarities imply that the policy
maker has relatively little eﬀect on prices, even at intermediate values of channel
capacity. Policy then optimally stabilizes output by nominally accommodating
mark-up shocks.
This result is found to be robust to a number of extensions, such as imperfect
observations of shocks by the policy maker or uncertainty of the policy maker
about the value of the private sector’s channel capacity.
When mark-up shocks display persistence, the optimal policy reaction varies
over time as information about the shocks slowly dissipates in the economy. Op-
timal policy can then be characterized by increasing amounts of accommodation
in the medium term and negative accommodation in the long-run. A persistent
mark-up shock thus generates a hump-shaped price response and a slowly de-
creasing output level.
The paper also brieﬂy analyzes the case where ﬁrms’ prices are strategic sub-
stitutes. Optimal policy then tends to react with nominal demand contractions
in response to mark-up shocks. However, when the degree of substitutability
is suﬃciently strong, common knowledge rational expectations equilibria where
agents observe shocks perfectly are not robust to arbitrarily small amounts of
imperfect common knowledge about shocks.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the monopolistically
competitive economy and section 3 brieﬂy describes optimal policy for two com-
mon knowledge benchmarks where shocks are either perfectly observable or com-
pletely unobservable. Information channels are introduced in section 4 which
summarizes relevant results from information theory. Section 5 then determines
the rational expectations equilibrium with imperfect common knowledge and
section 6 characterizes optimal monetary policy. A conclusion summarizes the
main ﬁndings.
2 A simple Lucas-type model
Consider a ﬂexible price economy with a continuum of monopolistically com-
petitive ﬁrms i ∈ [0,1] and a central bank that (imperfectly) controls nominal
demand. Except for the information assumptions the model is standard.
As is well known, e.g. Woodford (2001a), the log-linearized ﬁrst order condi-
tions for ﬁrms in monopolistic competition deliver a standard pricing equation
of the form
pt(i)=E
£
pt + ξyt|Ii
t
¤
+ εi
t, (1)
4where pt(i) denotes the log of ﬁrm i’s proﬁt maximizing price, pt the log average
price (pt =
R
pt(i)di), yt the log output gap (yt =l o gYt
Y ,w h e r eY is the output
level emerging in the absence of any aggregate shocks), and Ii
t the information
available to ﬁrm i.
The stochastic component εi
t in equation (1) is a ﬁrm-speciﬁc mark-up shock.
This shock is assumed to have an idiosyncratic component φi
t and a component
εt that is common to all ﬁrms:
εi
t = εt + φi
t.
The idiosyncratic component is thought to represent an eﬃcient variation in the
relative prices of the goods of diﬀerent ﬁrms. The cross-sectional distribution of
the φi
t is assumed to be time-invariant with zero mean. The common mark-up
shock εt is given by
εt ∼ iiN(0,σ2
ε)
and is a source of aggregate price level risk in the economy, that generates an
incentive for the policy maker to intervene.
To simplify the exposition, it will be assumed that the mark-up shock εi
t of
as i n g l eﬁrm does not convey any information about the average shock εt.T h i s
is the case when the variance of the common mark-up shock is small relative to
the variance in the innovation of the process φi
t, denoted by σ2
φ, i.e. whenever
σ2
ε/σ2
φ ≈ 0.
This assumption is made for analytical convenience and insures that all infor-
mation about εt enters ﬁrms’ information sets via the information channels.6
The parameter ξ > 0 in equation (1) is crucial since it determines whether
ﬁrms’ prices are strategic complements or substitutes. This can be seen by
deﬁning the (log) nominal spending gap qt as
qt = yt + pt,
and using it to substitute yt in equation (1):
pt(i)=E
£
(1 − ξ)pt + ξqt|Ii
t
¤
+ εi
t. (2)
For ξ ≤ 1 prices are strategic complements since each ﬁrm’s optimal price is
(weakly) increasing with the average price level for a given level of nominal
demand qt.F o r ξ > 1 prices become strategic substitutes since each ﬁrm’s
optimal price is then decreasing with the average price level.
6None of the qualitative results depend on this assumption as long as εi
t does not fully
reveal εt.
5For most part of the paper, and unless otherwise stated, prices are assumed
to be strategic complements, i.e. 0 < ξ ≤ 1. The case of strategic substitutes is
brieﬂy considered at the end.
We now describe the demand side of the economy. The central bank imper-
fectly controls nominal demand qt, i.e.
qt = q∗
t + δt,
where q∗
t is the target level chosen by the central bank and δt ∼ iiN(0,σ2
δ) is a
control error that realizes after the policy maker has determined q∗
t but before
ﬁrms decide about prices.
C o n t r o lo fn o m i n a ls p e n d i n gc a nb ea c h i e v e di nv a r i o u sw a y s .I na ne c o n o m y
featuring a quantity equation, e.g. in the form of a binding cash-in-advance
constraint, it may be established through control of nominal money balances.
Alternatively, nominal demand could be controlled by setting an appropriate
level for the nominal interest rate, which is the policy instrument used by most
central banks today. However, which of these instruments is eﬀectively used
does not matter for the results in this paper.
2.1 Central bank objective function
We suppose that the central bank seeks to minimize the quadratic deviations of
prices and output from their target values:
min
q∗
t
E
"
∞ X
t=0
βt
³
(pt)
2 +( yt)
2
´
|ICB
t
#
(3)
The central bank optimizes conditional on its information set ICB
t which con-
tains (potentially noisy) information about the mark-up shock εt but no infor-
mation about the control error δt.
Equation (3) assumes that the output gap target is equal to zero in all
periods, which implies that the central bank has no incentive to raise output
above its natural rate. The log price level target is equally set to zero. Choosing
ad i ﬀerent price level target or a time-varying deterministic target path would
not cause any diﬀerence for the subsequent results.7
We assume that the central bank decides about q∗
t before ﬁrms set their
prices, which implies that the central bank can commit to q∗
t.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
real eﬀects of nominal demand policy will be due to the systematic variation in
monetary policy only.
7Yet, choosing an inﬂation target amounts to choosing a history dependent and, thus,
stochastic price level target. This would substantially alter the analysis since ﬁrms would
then have to inform themselves about the changing target level.
6 
 
beginning                       end  of 
of period t                     p e r i o d   t 
 
  1. Aggregate 
mark-up shock 
realizes 
2. Central bank 
receives 
information  
and sets policy 
3. Nominal 
control error 
realizes 
 
4. Firms receive 
information and 
set prices 
 
Figure 1: Sequence of events
Note that objective (3) diﬀers somewhat from standard quadratic approxi-
mations of the welfare function. Such approximations for economies with mo-
nopolistic competition typically lead to a term capturing the dispersion of prices
across ﬁrms, see Woodford (2001a) or Ball et. al. (2002), while equation (3)
contains instead a term capturing the variability of the price level.
Cross sectional price variation is welfare reducing because price dispersion
generates ineﬃcient substitution of goods of diﬀerent variety. Variations in the
aggregate price level per se, however, are not welfare reducing since the price
level is irrelevant for the eﬃciency of the consumption decisions.
For a number of reasons, however, we decided to use a more traditional
objective function containing a price level term.
Most importantly, standard arguments for including a price dispersion term
do not seem very appropriate. In the present model prices display ineﬃcient
dispersion because ﬁrms’ information sets contain some amount of private in-
formation. This diﬀers from New Keynesian models where price dispersion
is instead due to nominal price stickiness in combination with time varying
proﬁt-maximizing prices. To assume that consumers adapt the consumption
of diﬀerent varieties to information-induced price dispersion would amount to
assuming that consumers know about ﬁrms’ private information. This seems
highly unlikely.
Moreover, price stability is the standard objective of modern central banks.
Therefore, at least from a central banker’s perspective, objective functions
should contain a price level target. It is acknowledged, however, that the price
level target does not capture welfare implications that can be deduced directly
from the model.
2.2 Time-line
Before going into the details of the analysis we brieﬂy summarize the sequence
of events within each period. As illustrated in ﬁgure 1, the period starts with
the realization of the aggregate mark-up shock. The central bank then receives a
(potentially noisy) signal of the shock and determines its policy q∗
t. Thereafter,
7the nominal control error δt realizes. Finally, ﬁrms receive (potentially noisy)
information about the shocks and the central bank’s policy choice and then set
their prices.
3 Optimal policy in two benchmark settings
This section considers two common knowledge settings with rather extreme
informational assumptions. In the ﬁrst setting it is assumed that ﬁrms perfectly
observe aggregate mark-up shocks εt and nominal spending shocks δt;i nt h e
second setting we assume that ﬁrms do not observe shocks at all. The optimal
policies for these settings will serve as useful benchmarks when analyzing policy
in environments with imperfect common knowledge about these shocks.
3.1 Benchmark I: Perfectly observable shocks
Suppose ﬁrms perfectly observe the shocks εt and δt, the policy maker perfectly
observes εt, and this is common knowledge. Based on equation (2) ﬁrm i’s
optimal price pt(i) can be expressed as
pt(i)=E
£
(1 − ξ)pt + ξqt|Ii
t
¤
+ εi
t
= E [(1 − ξ)pt|It]+ξqt + εi
t. (4)
where the second line uses the fact that all ﬁrms share the same information set
and assumes that qt is a function of the shocks εt and δt and, thus, perfectly
observed by agents.
Integrating equation (4) over i ∈ [0,1] and taking conditional expectations
with respect to It delivers
E [pt|It]=qt +
1
ξ
εt, (5)
which shows that agents can pin down average expectations as a function of the
random variables εt and qt. By substituting equation (5) into (4), integrating
over i, and using one more time the deﬁnition of qt, one can determine how
prices and output depend on shocks and policy decisions:
pt = qt +
1
ξ
εt (6)
yt = −
1
ξ
εt. (7)
As one would expect, nominal demand qt aﬀects the price level but has no eﬀect
on output. This is an example of the classical monetary neutrality result that
holds in models without nominal rigidities and information asymmetries (Lucas
(1972)).
8Since nominal demand policy has no eﬀect on output, optimal policy stabi-
lizes prices:
q∗
t = −
1
ξ
εt. (8)
Under optimal policy prices then ﬂuctuate in response to the nominal control
error δt and output depends on the aggregate mark-up shock εt only.
3.2 Benchmark II: Unobservable shocks
We now consider the case where ﬁrms have no information about the realization
of mark-up shocks and control errors. The policy maker continues to observe
mark-up shocks perfectly.
Firms’ expectations about shocks are given by the mean values of shocks,
which are equal to zero. Equation (1) and the deﬁnition of qt then imply
pt = εt (9)
yt = qt − εt. (10)
Since nominal demand policy and spending shocks are unobserved, they come as
a ’surprise’ and aﬀect real variables only. Optimal policy then seeks to stabilize
output, which is achieved by nominally accommodating mark-up shocks:
q∗
t = εt.
Under optimal policy, prices now respond to mark-up shocks and output is
driven by control errors, which is the opposite of the full information setup
considered in the previous section.
4 Imperfect common knowledge and informa-
tion channels
From here on we consider the more realistic case of economic agents that do not
share a common information set.
We assume that each ﬁrm (and potentially also the policy maker) receives
information through a so-called information channel that is contaminated with
idiosyncratic noise.8 The presence of noise will generate private information
about the shocks hitting the economy.
Information channels allow for the transmission of information from the
source to the receiver in a similar way as telephone or modem lines do. However,
8Information channels have been introduced by Shannon (1948). See Cover and Thomas
(1991) for a textbook treatment and Sims (2001) for an application in macroeconomics.
9due to the presence of noise, the information arriving at the receiver (the chan-
nel output) does not perfectly reveal the information at the source (the channel
input). Noise may arise, for example, from limited attention on the part of the
receiver or from interpretation errors due to background noise in the channel.
An information channel can be characterized by its capacity K ≥ 0.T h e
capacity places an upper bound on the amount of information that can be
transmitted via the channel, as will be made precise below. Channel capacity is a
simple technology parameter, like the TFP-parameter in a production function,
that depends on channel features such as the number of signals the channel can
transmit per period of time, the number of letters in the channel’s alphabet, the
probability with which the respective letters are transmitted correctly, etc.
An attractive feature of information channels is that they limit only the over-
all amount of information ﬂowing to agents while agents decide which random
variables to observe with what precision. Agents, thus, choose the information
structure subject to the constraint imposed by the capacity limit. This causes
the information structure to be endogenous since agents’ information choices de-
pend on the stabilization policy pursued by the central bank and the parameters
characterizing the economy.
Readers familiar with Kalman ﬁltering may think of this situation as one
where agents choose their observation equation and where the information noise
is determined by the capacity of the available information channel.
In the next section we give a brief introduction to real-valued Gaussian in-
formation channels. Such channels will be used in the latter part of the paper.
Readers interested in a more detailed treatment may consult the textbook of
Cover and Thomas (1991) or the, very accessible, original contribution of Shan-
non (1948).
4.1 The real-valued Gaussian channel
Consider a ﬁrm choosing a price p ∈ R to maximize a quadratic proﬁt function
of the form
max
p −E
h
(p − ζ0Z)
2 |I
i
, (11)
where Z ∼ N(0,V) is a vector of shocks driving the economy. The linear
combination ζ0Z indicates that the ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximizing price is a function
o ft h e s es h o c k s . T h ev e c t o rζ0 may thereby depend on the parameters of the
underlying economic model, the policy pursued by the central bank, and other
factors that the agent takes as given.
Suppose the information set I is exogenous. The solution to the above
problem is then
p∗ = E[ζ0Z|I],
10and the expected loss equals
−Va r(ζ0Z|I). (12)
Now instead, suppose that the ﬁrm can choose its information structure I
b u tm u s tr e c e i v ei n f o r m a t i o na b o u tζ0Z through an information channel with
capacity K ∈ [0,∞).
The channel coding theorems (e.g. theorem 8.7.1 in Cover and Thomas
(1991)) state that channel capacity K places a limit on the amount of entropy
reduction that can be achieved by the channel.9 Formally,
H(ζ0Z) − H(ζ0Z|s) <K , (13)
where H(ζ0Z) denotes the entropy of the random variable ζ0Z prior to observing
the channel output signal s and H(ζ0Z|s) the entropy after observing the signal.
Intuitively, entropy is a measure of the uncertainty about a random variable.
Stated in these terms, equation (13) provides a bound for the maximum uncer-
tainty reduction that can be achieved by observing the channel output s.S i n c e
the entropy H(ζ0Z) is determined by the distribution of ζ0Z ∼ N(0,ζ0V ζ) and,
thus, taken as given, equation (13) simply implies that H(ζ0Z|s) must lie above
ac e r t a i nt h r e s h o l d .
What is the optimal information structure that fulﬁlls this entropy con-
straint? Equation (12) shows that the expected loss associated with any infor-
mation structure is equal to Va r(ξ0Z|s). Thus, choosing the optimal informa-
tion structure is identical to minimizing this conditional variance subject to the
constraint that H(ζ0Z|s) is above the threshold.
Shannon (1948) shows that Gaussian variables minimize the variance for a
given entropy.10 Thus, if possible, the observation noise should be Gaussian
such that the posterior distribution ξ0Z|s is Gaussian and has the minimum
variance property.
We will assume that the coding allows for such kind of Gaussian noise,
i.e. there exists a way to map the realizations of ζ0Z into a sequence of input
signals from the channel’s alphabet such that the observation noise generated
by the incorrect transmission of signals is Gaussian and independent across the
realization of the input signal.
When this is the case, optimal use of the channel implies that the channel
output signal s has a simple representation of the form
s = ζ0Z + η, (14)
9The entropy H(X) of a continous random variable X is deﬁned as H(X)=
−
R
ln(x)p(x)dx where p(x) is the probability density function of X and where the convention
is to take ln(x)p(x)=0when p(x)=0 .
10Shannon solves the dual problem of maximizing entropy for a given variance.
11where η ∼ N(0,σ2
η) is the Gaussian observation noise and σ2
η is the inﬁmum
variance satisfying the channel capacity constraint
lnVa r(ζ0Z) − lnVa r(ζ0Z|s) < 2K. (15)
Constraint (15) follows from equation (13) and the fact that the entropy of a
Gaussian random variable is equal to one half its log variance plus some constant.
From the updating formula for normal random variables11 and the capacity
constraint (15) it follows that the observation noise has (inﬁmum) variance
σ2
η =
1
e2K − 1
Va r(ζ0Z).
Firms’ expectations after observing the signal are then given by
E[ζ0Z|s]=k · s, (16)
where the Kalman gain k is
k =
Va r(ζ0Z)
Va r(ζ0Z)+σ2
η
=( 1− e−2K). (17)
Note that the Kalman gain in equation (17) is independent of the variance
of ζ0Z and, thus, independent of policy (ζ). This feature will be crucial later
on since it helps preserve the linear quadratic nature of the policy maker’s
optimization problem. It would be absent, however, if the variance of the ob-
servation noise was taken as the primitive parametrizing information frictions,
as is commonly done in the literature.
The gain k ∈ [0,1] in equation (17) will be used in the remaining part of
the paper as an index of how well agents observe their environment. When
k =0ﬁrms receive no information since σ2
η = ∞.C o n v e r s e l y , i f k =1ﬁrms
observe perfectly since σ2
η =0 . At intermediate value of k t h ev a r i a n c eo ft h e
observation noise is positive but ﬁnite and decreasing in k.
5 Rational expectations equilibrium with imper-
fect common knowledge
In this section we endow each ﬁrm with an information channel of given capacity
and solve for a rational expectations equilibrium (REE) in which ﬁrms choose
optimal information structures and proﬁt maximizing prices. As it turns out,
the rational expectations equilibrium is unique.
11Va r (ζ0Z|s)=Va r(ζ0Z) − Va r (ζ0Z)2/(Va r(ζ0Z)+σ2
η)
12Solving for the rational expectations equilibrium is not a trivial task. Since
the observation noise generated by the information channels is idiosyncratic,
ﬁrms do not know what other ﬁrms have observed and must formulate beliefs
about other agents’ beliefs, which leads to a system of higher order beliefs. Firms
can rationally formulate higher order beliefs because the stochastic properties
of the observation noise are assumed to be common knowledge.
The remainder of this section is structured as follows. Section 5.1 determines
how proﬁt-maximizing prices depend on ﬁrms’ higher-order beliefs. Section 5.2
then determines the rational expectations equilibrium with imperfect common
knowledge where ﬁrms gather information optimally.
5.1 Price setting with imperfect common knowledge
We ﬁr s th a v et oi n t r o d u c es o m en o t a t i o nt ob ea b l et or e f e rt oﬁrms’ expectations
of various order.
Let x
(n)
t|t (i) denote ﬁrm i0s n-th order expectation of xt, where the ’zero-th
order expectations’ are given by the variable itself, i.e.
x
(0)
t|t (i)=xt.
Expectations of order n +1are then obtained by averaging the n-th order
expectations over i and applying the expectations operator, i.e.
x
(n+1)
t|t (i)=E[
Z
x
(n)
t|t (i)di|Ii
t].
Therefore, x
(1)
t|t (i) denotes the familiar (ﬁrst order) expectation E[xt|Ii
t];t h e
second order expectations x
(2)
t|t (i) denote i’s expectations of the average (ﬁrst
order) expectations; the third order expectations x
(3)
t|t (i) denote i’s expectations
of the average second order expectations, etc.
With this notation the price setting equation (2) can be expressed as
p
(0)
t|t (i)=( 1− ξ)p
(1)
t|t (i)+ξq
(1)
t|t (i)+εi
t. (18)
Iterating on equation (18) by taking repeatedly the average over i and the
conditional expectations E[·|Ii
t],o n eo b t a i n s
pt(i)=E
"
∞ X
n=0
(1 − ξ)n
³
ξq
(n)
t|t +( 1− ξ)ε
(n)
t|t
´
|Ii
t
#
+ εi
t, (19)
where x
(n)
t|t =
R
x
(n)
t|t (i)di denotes the average expectations of order n.
Equation (19) expresses ﬁrm i’s proﬁt maximizing price as a function of ﬁrst
and higher order expectations of
ξqt +( 1− ξ)εt.
135.2 REE and optimal information structure
This section determines agents’ optimal information structure and characterizes
the rational expectations equilibrium.
Equation (19) and the discussion in section 4 imply that agents wish to
observe the term
∞ X
n=0
(1 − ξ)n
³
ξq
(n)
t|t +( 1− ξ)ε
(n)
t|t
´
(20)
as precisely as possible through their information channels.
Equation (20) shows that ﬁrms’ seek to observe a combination of the fun-
damental shocks and of agents’ higher-order expectations about these shocks.
The latter implies that to construct a rational expectations equilibrium one has
to determine a ﬁxed point in the space of beliefs where for given expectations
the signals obtained about these expectations exactly generate them.
A much simpler way to proceed, however, is to let agents observe only the
fundamentals
ξqt +( 1− ξ)εt. (21)
T h e yc a nt h e nc o n s t r u c tt h eh i g h e ro r d er beliefs in (20) using their (noisy)
observation of these fundamentals. As shown in the appendix, this leads to the
same equilibrium outcome, but equilibrium is much simpler to derive and easier
to interpret.
We proceed by assuming that ﬁrms’ observation equation is given by
si
t =( ξqt +( 1− ξ)εt)+ηi
t, (22)
where ηi
t is an idiosyncratic observation error that we take to be normally dis-
tributed for the reasons discussed in section 4.
Note that nominal demand qt in equation (22) will depend on the control
error δt and, provided policy reacts to mark-up shocks, on εt and possible central
bank observation errors about εt. The weights given to the shocks εt and δt in
equation (22), thus, depend on the policy pursued by the central bank, which
shows that the information structure is truly endogenous to the model.
From equation (16) it follows that
E[ξqt +( 1− ξ)εt|si
t]=ksi
t, (23)
where k =1− e2K, see equation (17).
14Integrating equation (23) over i, using equation (22) to substitute si
t,a n d
taking the expectations E[·|Ii
t] delivers
E[ξq
(1)
t|t +( 1− ξ)ε
(1)
t|t |Ii
t]=k2si
t,
while applying the same operations n times delivers
E[ξq
(n)
t|t +( 1− ξ)ε
(n)
t|t |Ii
t]=kn+1si
t. (24)
The previous equation reveals that agents’ higher order expectations (rationally)
react less strongly to the signal si
t than expectations of lower order. This is the
case because ﬁrms are increasingly uncertain about the expectations of higher
order. This feature will become important later on.
Using expression (24) to substitute the expectations in equation (19) and
averaging over i delivers the equilibrium price level:
pt =
k
1 − (1 − ξ)k
(ξqt +( 1− ξ)εt)+εt. (25)
Since the equilibrium price level is unique, there is a unique rational expectations
equilibrium. Finally, note that for k =1and k =0this equation reduces to the
common knowledge benchmarks (6) and (9), respectively.
6 Optimal stabilization policy
We now consider optimal nominal demand policy in the presence of imperfect
common knowledge.
Section 6.1 determines how optimal policy depends on ﬁrms’ ability to ob-
serve, as indexed by the Kalman gain k ∈ [0,1], and on the complementarity
parameter ξ. Section 6.2 then considers the eﬀects of uncertainty about the pri-
vate sector’s channel capacity and section 6.3 extends the analysis to the case
where mark-up shocks display persistence. Finally, section 6.4 discusses optimal
policy for the case where ﬁrms’ prices are strategic substitutes.
6.1 The baseline case
Since there are no intertemporal links, the policy maker’s stabilization problem
consists of a sequence of static maximization problems of the form:12
max
q∗
t
E[−p2
t − y2
t|ICB
t ] (26a)
s.t.
pt =
k
1 − (1 − ξ)k
(ξ(q∗
t + δt)+( 1− ξ)εt)+εt (26b)
yt = q∗
t + δt − pt. (26c)
12Equations (26b) and (26c) follow from equation (25) and the deﬁnitions of qt and q∗
t .
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Figure 2: Optimal policy reaction coeﬃcient
16The policy maker’s problem is linear-quadratic despite the presence of infor-
mation noise in the private sector. This is the case because the Kalman gains k
in equation (26b) are independent of policy. If the variance of observation noise
was speciﬁed exogenously this property would be lost and closed form solutions
would be unavailable, even for the relative simple policy problem at hand.
The solution to (26) is readily calculated to be
q∗
t = a(k,ξ) · E[εt|ICB
t ], (27)
where the reaction coeﬃcient
a(k,ξ)=−
ξk − (1 − k)
(ξk)
2 +( 1− k)
2 (28)
depends in a non-trivial way on ﬁrms’ ability to observe (k) and on the comple-
mentarity parameter (ξ).
A less surprising, but nevertheless important, feature of optimal policy is
that it displays certainty equivalence with respect to central bank information
imperfections about the fundamental εt. This follows directly from the linear
quadratic setup, and implies that central bank observation errors do not alter
the policy conclusions derived below.
Note also that when making the transition from the common knowledge
benchmarks to an imperfect common knowledge environment policy is continu-
ous since the reaction coeﬃcient converges to the benchmark values for k → 0
and k → 1.
A more surprising feature of optimal policy is that it tends to nominally
accommodate mark-up shocks (a>0) in the presence of strategic complemen-
tarities. In particular, policy is accommodative whenever:
k<
1
1+ξ
.
Strong strategic complementarities (small values of ξ) cause policy to nominally
accommodate mark-up shocks for a large range of k values. This is illustrated
in ﬁgure 2 which depicts the reaction coeﬃcient for intermediate values of k and
various degrees of strategic complementarity. Woodford (2001b) suggests that
ξ =0 .15 is a plausible parameter value for the U.S. economy. In this case policy
is accommodative as long as k<0.869.
Figure 2 also illustrates that the optimal reaction coeﬃcient may increase
with k,p r o v i d e dξ < 1. Thus, it may be optimal to accommodate mark-up
shocks more strongly in economies where ﬁrms receive more information about
shocks.
17Intuition for these ﬁndings can be obtained by considering the optimal reac-
tion coeﬃcients for the case that the policy maker pursues only one objective at
the time, namely either the stabilization of the output gap or the stabilization
of the price level.
Consider the case of pure output stabilization. The optimal reaction coeﬃ-
cient is then given by
ay =
1
1 − k
,
which implies that nominal accommodation should increase with k. Clearly,
higher values of k imply that ﬁrms receive more information about nominal
demand variations. Therefore, a larger share of these variations gets translated
into price movements. Policy can counteract this eﬀect and close the output
gap by increasingly accommodating shocks.13
Next, consider the case of pure price level stabilization. The optimal reaction
coeﬃcient is then given by
ap = −
1
kξ
< 0.
The optimal coeﬃcient is now negative and depends on k and ξ.I np a r t i c u l a r ,
smaller values of ξ and k require a more negative reaction coeﬃcient, which can
be explained as follows.
At low values of k ﬁrms’ do not observe nominal demand variations very
well and, thus, react weakly to policy. As a result, a more negative reaction
coeﬃcient is required to undo any given mark-up shock to prices.
At small values of ξ higher-order beliefs are relatively important for ﬁrms’
price setting decision, see equation (19). Since higher order beliefs react less
strongly to the signals received by agents, see equation (24), a strong policy
reaction is required to achieve any given change in the price level.
The optimal reaction coeﬃcient for the policy maker pursuing output and
price level stability will be a convex combination between the positive coeﬃcient
required for output stabilization and the negative coeﬃcient required for price
level stabilization.
As k increases the weight on the price level coeﬃcient must increase because
the trade-oﬀ between the two policy objectives becomes more favorable to the
price level objective: at larger values of k output stabilization leads to increased
price level variability, which works against output stabilization; at the same
time price level stabilization leads to lower output variability, which works in
favor of price level stabilization.
13Policy successfully stabilizes output at the target as long as k<1. Deviations from target
occur only in response to control errors.
18If, as k increases, this trade-oﬀ becomes more favorable to price level stabi-
lization fast enough, then the optimal policy reaction coeﬃcient will decrease
with k.14 The speed at which the trade-oﬀ is shifted, however, depends cru-
cially on the parameter ξ. For low values of ξ price level stabilization remains
unattractive even at intermediate values of k since price level stabilization re-
quires strong output movements due to the sluggishness of higher order beliefs.15
As a result, the increase of ay in k carries over to the case where the policy maker
pursues output and price level stability. This explains why policy tends to be
accommodative and why nominal accommodation may have to increase with k
in the presence of strategic complementarities.
6.2 Uncertainty about the degree of information frictions
This section analyzes optimal policy when the policy maker is uncertain about
the capacity constraint faced by the private sector. Such uncertainty is likely
to be important in real-world policy situations.
Let µ(·) denote the policy maker’s beliefs about the value of k ∈ [0,1]. Then,
in analogy to equation (27), the optimal reaction coeﬃcient is given by
a(µ(·),ξ)=−
ξE[k] − (1 − E[k])
ξ2E[k2]+1− 2E[k]+E[k2]
, (29)
where the expectations are computed using beliefs µ(·).
Equations (28) and (29) show that for a given mean belief E[k] the reaction
coeﬃcient has the same sign independently of the degree of uncertainty about
k. Thus, mean-preserving spreads in beliefs do not alter the sign of the optimal
reaction coeﬃcient.
Equations (28) and (29) also show that certainty equivalence fails to hold.
Since
E[k2] ≥ E2[k], (30)
a mean-preserving increase in the spread of beliefs causes the optimal reaction
coeﬃcient to decrease in absolute value. Uncertainty about k,t h u s ,l e a d st oa
less strong optimal policy reaction.
14This holds independently from the fact that ap is increasing in k and is a consequence of
the diﬀerent signs of ap and ay.
15In the extreme case where ξ → 0 the optimal reaction coeﬃcient for an output and price
target is given by
lim
ξ→0
a(k,ξ)=
1
1 − k
which is the coeﬃcient for a pure output target. Thus, for ξ → 0 the weight on the output
coeﬃcient never decreases with k.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses under optimal policy (ξ =0 .15, K =0 .2)
Using equations (29) and (30) one can compute a lower bound (in absolute
terms) for the optimal reaction coeﬃcient that is consistent with any given mean
belief E[k]. This bound is given by
b =
1 − E[k] − E[k]ξ
1 − E[k]+E[k]ξ2. (31)
The optimal reaction coeﬃcient is equal to b if the dispersion of beliefs is max-
imal but is larger (in absolute terms) otherwise.16
Interestingly, if strategic complementarities are pervasive, i.e. if ξ is small,
then b ≈ 1 for almost all values of E[k].17 High amounts of uncertainty about k
coupled with strong strategic complementarities, thus, require the policy maker
to accommodate mark-up shocks one-for-one with a nominal demand increase.
Optimal policy is then identical to the case where shocks are completely unob-
servable, i.e. where k =0with probability one.
6.3 Persistent mark-up shocks
The policy derived in the previous sections can be interpreted as optimal short-
run policy since mark-up shocks have been assumed to be white noise. This
16For given mean beliefs E[k] maximal dispersion is achieved by assigning probability E[k]
to k =1and probability 1 − E[k] to k =0 .
17This fails to hold when E[k] is suﬃciently close to one.
20section asks how policy has to react in the medium to long-run when mark-up
shocks are persistent.
Suppose that mark-up shocks arrive according to a Poisson process with
probability α ∈ (0,1) where the value of new shocks is independent of previous
shocks, i.e.
εt =
½
εt−1 with probability α
iiN(0,σ2
ε) with probability 1 − α
Furthermore, suppose that the arrival of new shocks is common knowledge.
This implies that ﬁrms are uncertain only about the realization of the shock
and about other ﬁrms’ expectations of the shock, but not about whether a new
shock has arrived and whether other ﬁrms have noticed the arrival.
Finally, we assume the control error δt to be equal to zero and the central
bank to observe mark-up shocks perfectly. The presence of control errors or
central bank observation errors would (unnecessarily) complicate the analysis.18
Suppose a new shock hits the economy in period t =1 . Since current policy
choices do not constrain future choices, optimal policy in period t =1is the
same as with white noise shocks. Equation (27) then implies that the optimal
reaction coeﬃcient is given by
a1 = a(k,ξ)=a(1 − e−2K,ξ).
In periods t ≥ 2 ﬁrms possess prior information about the shock from the
signals they observed in earlier periods. Since receiving t times a signal via
an information channel with capacity K is identical to receiving a single signal
from a channel with capacity t · K,t h eo p t i m a lr e a c t i o nc o e ﬃcient for period t
is given by:19
at = a(1 − e−2tK,ξ).
Figure 3 displays optimal nominal demand policy and the resulting behavior
of output and prices for a persistent mark-up shock of one unit.20 Optimal policy
generates a hump-shaped price response and a gradually declining output level.
Policy initially accommodates the mark-up shock to stabilize output. In
the subsequent periods accommodation becomes even stronger for the reasons
18The presence of iid control errors, for example, would cause agents to shift attention (i.e.
the weights in the observation equation) from the mark-up shock in early periods to the control
errors in later periods.
19This follows from the fact that the capacity constraint is linear in the entropies and
capacity parameter.
20The ﬁgure assumes that ξ =0 .15 and K =0 .2. Output and prices for period t can be
calculated from equations (26b) and (26c) by setting q∗
t = at, k =1− e−2tK,a n dδt =0 .
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Figure 4: Optimal reaction coeﬃcient with strategic substitutability (ξ =2 )
discussed in section 6.1.21 Over time, however, ﬁrms become less uncertain
about the value of the shock and about how other ﬁrms perceive it. Nominal
demand variations are then increasingly ineﬀective in stabilizing output and the
policy maker starts to stabilize the price level by reducing nominal demand.
6.4 Strategic substitutes
This section brieﬂy discusses the case where prices are strategic substitutes
(ξ > 1). Interestingly, rational expectations equilibria with common knowledge
may then not be robust to the introduction of (arbitrarily) small amounts of
imperfect common knowledge.
If strategic substitutabilities are suﬃciently strong (ξ > 2) then rational
expectations equilibria cease to exist for all k<1 suﬃciently close to one. This
i st h ec a s eb e c a u s et h es u mo fh i g h e ro r d er expectations in the price setting
equation (19) does then not converge, see equation (24). It implies that the
perfect information benchmark is not robust to arbitrarily small amounts of
imperfect common knowledge.22
The no-observation benchmark, however, is robust to small amounts of im-
perfect common knowledge. If information frictions are suﬃciently severe, i.e.
if k< 1
ξ−1, rational expectations equilibria start again to exist since strong
information frictions cause higher order expectations to react more sluggishly.
Provided ξ ≤ 2, a rational expectations equilibrium exists independently of
the value of k. Figure 4 displays the optimal reaction coeﬃcient as a function
21If the value of K is large enough, nominal accommodation may not increase initially, see
ﬁgure 2.
22See Kajii and Morris (1997) for a game-theoretic example where the unique equilibrium
is not robust to imperfect common knowledge.
22of k when ξ =2 . Unlike with strategic substitutability, the reaction coeﬃcients
now tend to be negative, which is due to ﬁrms reacting with a negative coeﬃcient
to mark-up shocks, see equation (19).
7C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper shows that optimal policy that seeks to stabilize the quadratic devi-
ations of output and prices from their target values may, at ﬁrst sight, prescribe
rather non-intuitive measures when the underlying economy is characterized by
strategic complementarities and imperfect common knowledge about shocks.
In the short-run, optimal policy nominally accommodates aggregate mark-up
shocks for a wide range of private sector information frictions. Accommodation
may even have to increase in the medium term before decreasing in the long-
run as information about shocks becomes (almost) common knowledge. These
results are shown to be robust to the policy maker being uncertain about the
value of mark-up shocks and about the information frictions in the private sector.
The conclusions diﬀer, however, when ﬁrms’ prices are strategic substitutes.
If rational expectations equilibria exist, optimal policy then tends to react with
nominal demand contractions to mark-up shocks.
A Appendix
The text assumes that agents receive a signal about (21). Below we show that
the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) derived under this assumption is
unaﬀected when allowing agents to receive a signal about (20) instead.
Let ft denote the inﬁnite sum in equation (20). Equation (24) implies that
in the rational expectations equilibrium where agents observe (21):
ft =
∞ X
n=0
((1 − ξ)k)
n (ξqt +( 1− ξ)εt) (32)
and
E[ft|si
t]=k
∞ X
n=0
((1 − ξ)k)
n ¡
ξqt +( 1− ξ)εt + ηi
t
¢
= k
∞ X
n=0
((1 − ξ)k)
n (ξqt +( 1− ξ)εt)) +
k
1 − (1 − ξ)k
ηi
t. (33)
Now instead suppose that agents observe
e si
t = ft + e ηi
t.
23Expectations are then given by
E[ft|e si
t]=ke si
t
= kft + ke ηi
t
= k
∞ X
n=0
((1 − ξ)k)
n (ξqt +( 1− ξ)εt)+ke ηi
t. (34)
where the last line uses the fact that in the REE (32) holds. The expectations
in (34) are identical to ones in (33) if
e ηi
t =
1
1 − (1 − ξ)k
ηi
t,
The previous equation follows from the fact that the agent faces the same chan-
nel capacity constraint, independently of which object is observed. Equation
(19) together with E[ft|e si
t]=E[ft|si
t] then implies that agents set the same
proﬁt maximizing price, independently of whether they observe (20) or (21).
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